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Libre-échange 
Legal Issues Arising From Protectionist 
Government Procurement Policies in Canada 
and the United States 
Denis LEMIEUX* 
Les marchés publics confèrent aux différents paliers gouvernementaux 
une force de frappe qu'ils sont susceptibles d'utiliser pour atteindre des 
objectifs économiques et sociaux en plus d'obtenir des biens et services de 
qualité à un prix raisonnable. Ceci donne lieu à l'élaboration et à la mise en 
œuvre de politiques d'achats. Ces politiques prennent rarement la forme de 
lois et de règlements mais sont adoptées le plus souvent par voie de directives, 
d'énoncés de politique et de pratiques administratives. 
Toutefois, ceci ne signifie pas qu'il n'existe pas de cadre juridique des 
politiques d'achats. Les dispositions de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 
relatives au commerce interprovincial et international, de même que les droits 
à l'égalité et à la mobilité enchâssés dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, 
servent de cadre juridique minimal aux politiques d'achats. 
À ces normes s'ajoutent les obligations internationales du Canada à 
l'intérieur du cadre de /'Accord général du G A TT et, pour le Gouvernement 
fédéral, le Code des marchés publics adopté lors du Tokyo Round. 
La mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange canado-américain viendra 
apporter une nouvelle limite à l'autonomie des initiateurs de politiques 
d'achats publics. 
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1. Introduction 
The needs of goods and services by public agencies, including government 
departments, crown corporations, hospitals, schools and local government 
are enormous. In Canada, total purchase spending amounts to approximately 
60 $ billion annually '. There are several ways to measure government expen-
diture but the most commonly used covers "exhaustive expenditures", the 
total value of all resources consumed to produce the goods and services that 
governments provide. Based on this measurement, government procurement 
in Canada amounts to about 18% of the Gross Domestic Product whereas it 
is assessed at about 16% in the United States. 
Furthermore, the contracting-out process is seen as a more flexible and 
efficient way for governmental authorities to implement administrative 
policies. In fact, the granting of contracts stimulates the development of 
needed technology in key industries, helps to train and employ the labour 
force, is a tool to end discrimination in employment and favours the 
industrial development of less affluent regions of the country. 
For political reasons, to ensure stability and economic growth in the 
country and to protect domestic industries against growing import competition, 
Canada, like many other countries, has adopted various preferential policies 
to regulate its contracting-out procedure. How will these "Buy-Canadian" 
and their counterpart "Buy-American" practices be affected by free trade ? 
As this study will illustrate, these protectionist policies are widespread 
among public agencies in Canada and the United States. They are also 
difficult to reconcile with any substantial free trade agreement. Moreover, 
this study purports to examine the legality of these measures in Canada and 
the United States with respect to their respective relevant constitutional and 
international provisions. Within each country, interprovincial or interstate 
trade, mobility rights and equality rights impose limitations upon preferential 
policies. At an international level, international jurisdiction over trade and 
foreign affairs and international agreements pertaining to free trade also 
restrain governments' power to enact protectionist measures. Compliance 
with these numerous obligations is necessary to ensure the validity of 
preferential policies. However, these considerations require a preliminary 
observation on the nature, content and forms of these policies. 
1. Reference taken from A. R., MOROZ, Some observations on non-tariff barriers and their use 
in Canada in Canada-United States Free Trade, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1986, 239, p. 251. 
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1.1. The concept of protectionism 
in the awarding of government contracts 
The term "preferential purchasing policy", the Canadian counterpart of 
"Buy American" law refers to any statute, administrative regulation, or 
provision in a public contract which has the effect of limiting the procurement 
by a government of any manufactured goods or raw materials to those 
manufactured goods or raw materials which are produced in Canada or in 
any province. These policies may be implicit, for example by using administrative 
discretion, or explicit. They may also be a matter of policy or a matter of 
law11. 
In Canada, at both provincial and federal levels, governments have 
adopted preferential purchasing policies for the procurement of goods and 
services. The provincial governments' objective is to favour their own products 
and thereby develop their provincial economy. The federal department of 
Supply and Services has also an internal policy which provides for the 
purchase of goods and services to the closest point of consumption. 
1.2. Socio-economic reasons behind protectionist policies 
The major justification for interprovincial trade barriers appears to be 
the desire to build provincial economies. More specifically, they reduce the 
growing problems due to economic recession and unemployment. Secondary 
industry as well as small and medium-size business benefit from these 
policies. Not only do they maximize the effects of development and revenue 
but they also offer the effect of preferential policies practiced by other 
governments. Through retaliative measures, governments neutralize the 
negative effect of other governments' policies and reassure provincial manu-
facturers and organized labour as to the increasing presence of foreign 
interests on provincial markets. 
However, these policies may not necessarily be more economically 
advantageous. The government's decision to implement them is often based 
on sentiment rather than reason2. In fact, economic reasons rarely form an 
essential part of that decision-making process. As stated by H. Jackson : 
I.I J. OLSON, "Federal Limitations on State'Buy-American'Laws", 21 Colum.J. Transnatl, L. 
177(1982), note 1. 
2. 1. BEKNIER, "L'économie québécoise face à la concurrence extérieure: les fondements 
scientifiques de la politique d'achat préférentiel du Québec", Éludes internationales, vol. 
XV, n° 1, mars 1984, p. 92. 
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"Discrimination in favor of local products sometimes seems to be one of the 
basic human urges"3. 
Nevertheless, a few objections can be expressed as to the legitimacy of 
these policies. Above all, preferential procurement policies violate the general 
principle of international free trade and comparative economic advantage in 
international markets. They increase consumer prices by preventing the sale 
of products produced by countries who can most economically manufacture 
them. Retaliative action by other provinces or countries against their products 
can ensue as a result of these policies. A taxpayer is also disadvantaged since 
he has to pay higher taxes when a provincially-made product is chosen over a 
cheaper foreign product. Within a country, provincial preferential policies 
reduce national efficiency and pose a threat to greater economic integration 
and economic prosperity of the country. 
1.3. Protectionism in the awarding 
of government contracts in Canada 
Discrimination in favour of domestic products has long been part of 
federal and provincial purchasing policies. Different devices have been 
elaborated at all levels of the procurement process to ensure preferential 
treatment to domestic products. The discrimination may be explicit or 
implicit in these procedures. Furthermore, governments have used different 
forms to implement these policies. 
In their bid for government procurement contracts, outside suppliers are 
subject to various laws, regulations and administrative rules and practices 
which contain protectionist policies 
1.3.1. Content of protectionist policies 
Discrimination in the award of supply contracts appears in two different 
forms. In some instances, procurement decisions are the object of visible and 
open discrimination. Foreign suppliers may also be subject to less visible 
forms of discrimination at different stages of the government procurement 
process. 
3. J.H. JACKSON, World Trade and the LawofG.A.T.T., Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, 
p. 274. 
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1.3.1.1. Visible, open discrimination in relation 
to procurement decisions 
Governments may choose to impose discriminatory requirements for the 
award of supply contracts. Procurement decisions have therefore to be in 
accordance with government purchasing policies that require a total or 
partial prohibition on the purchase of imported products or that preference 
be given to domestic suppliers. The United States Buy American Act contains 
such a form of discrimination. 
1.3.1.2. Less visible forms of discrimination resulting from the operation 
of the government procurement procedures 
a) First stage : invitation to participate 
Depending upon the tendering procedure used, foreign suppliers may be 
excluded from the procurement process as early as at the first stage. In the 
case of public tendering, the notice of tender may be inadequately publicized. 
Notices are not always published in a readily available source. Foreign 
suppliers are therefore not always aware of pending purchases. 
Government may also choose to proceed by selective tendering on the 
basis of a pre-established list of qualified suppliers. The criteria of admissibility 
to this list may be vague and unclear and thereby discriminatory. Foreign 
suppliers who are excluded from the list will not be invited to tender. 
Furthermore, not all suppliers included on the list are necessarily invited to 
bid. The governmental authority may exercise this discretion to discriminate 
against foreign suppliers. Finally, the government may simply elect to invite 
suppliers to tender for a particular purchase. These invitations could be 
tainted with discrimination. 
Invitation to participate may also be done by single tendering. Without 
proceeding by tender, this procedure consists in contacting and negotiating 
with a chosen supplier. Foreign suppliers are particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination since the discretionary selection process can be exercised in 
favour of domestic suppliers. 
b) Second stage : obstacles preventing out-of-province suppliers 
from submitting a responsive bid 
Although he may be invited to participate, the out-of-province supplier 
may still be prevented from submitting a bid. Thus, inadequate information 
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in the notice of tender on such matters as the products to be purchased, the 
time limits to submit a bid, the specifications and requirements of the product 
can be fatal to the out-of-province suppliers. Domestic suppliers often have 
the possibility of making further inquiries and of obtaining additional 
information due to contacts within the governmental apparatus and to easier 
access to information. 
Purchasing authorities can also discriminate against out-of-province 
suppliers by granting a short time period between the notice of tender and the 
submission of bids. Since out-of-province suppliers are farther from the 
scene, they require more time to prepare and submit a bid which complies 
with domestic requirements. Short deadlines will necessarily have the effect 
of eliminating foreign suppliers from the government procurement market. 
Furthermore, domestic suppliers are often aware beforehand of forthcoming 
tenders. They therefore dispose of a clear advantage over out-of-province 
suppliers not only for the submission of bids within the time requirement but 
also for the preparation of well-structured tenders. 
Discriminatory rules for qualification of suppliers may also prevent 
foreign suppliers from submitting a bid. The purchasing authority may 
impose requirements pertaining to residence, registration, local representation, 
financial guarantees and evidence of ability to perform the contract. Out-of-
province suppliers may be unable to comply with such requirements. 
Finally, technical specifications of the product can be significant barriers. 
For different reasons, these requirements may be more easily satisfied by 
domestic suppliers. For instance, foreign suppliers may be unable to comply 
with certain specifications of quality and type of material to be used. 
c) Third stage : submission, receipt and opening of tenders ; 
evaluation of tenders and award of contracts 
At this stage, the foreign supplier may still be discriminated against 
in his bid for a purchasing contract. Thus, domestic suppliers may be offered 
the possibility of modifying their bids. Delay of reception of his bid at the 
correct destination will also prejudice the out-of-province supplier. The 
opening of tenders in secret and the awarding of contracts on the basis of 
vague criteria provide the pruchasing authority with other opportunities to 
discriminate against out-of-province suppliers. 
d) Fourth stage : information and review 
Information pertaining to the procurement procedures and the reasons 
for the decision is often difficult to obtain from the contracting authority. 
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Out-of-province suppliers are therefore kept in the dark about the procurement 
procedures. Furthermore, complaints are often useless since a proper grievance 
procedure is rarely provided for. An unsuccessful out-of-province supplier 
has little hope of seeking redress from a discriminatory government procurement 
procedure. 
1.3.2. Forms of protectionist policies 
Governments use various instruments to grant preferential treatment to 
domestic suppliers. These forms may differ according to the level of government, 
federal or provincial. The United States' approach will also serve as 
comparison. 
1.3.2.1 Federal barriers 
There exist various ways by which the federal government grants 
preferential treatment to domestic suppliers. The most visible form of barrier 
to the free flow of international goods is the Canadian content preference. 
Subsection 4(1) of the Tenders and Works Contracts By-law4 provides that : 
No contract for the execution of any work shall be awarded by the Corporation for 
an amount in excess of $ 1 million if the content of the tender of the person to whom 
the contract is to be awarded is not predominantly Canadian unless the Corporation 
obtains the approval of the Governor in Council. 
In a less visible way, foreign suppliers may also be discriminated against 
at the first stage of the procurement process through single tendering 
procedures. In that respect, section 8 of the Government Contracts Regulations5 
provides that the contracting authority may be exempted from inviting 
tenders under certain circumstances and therefore may contact a single 
supplier. 
4. SOR/83-242, 18 March, 1983, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 117, n° 7 p. 1178; see also, 
Halifax Tendersand Works Contract By-law, SOR/84-417, 31 May, 1984, CanadaGazette 
Part II, Vol. 118, n° 12, p. 2544, sections 4(1 )(b), 4(2); Prince Rupert Tendersand Works 
Contract By-law, SOR/84-420, 31 May, 1984 Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 118, n° 12, 
p. 2556, sections4(l)(b),4(2); Quebec Tendersand Works Contract By-law, SOR/84-423, 
31 May, 1984 Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 118, n° 12, p. 2569, sections 4(l)(b), 4(2); Sl-
John's Port Corporation Tenders and Works Contract By-law, SOR/85-991, 10 October, 
1985 Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. I 19, n» 22, p. 4391, sections 4(l)(b), 4(2). 
5. C.R.C. 1978, Vol. VII, c. 701. 
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1.3.2.2. Provincial barriers 
The province of Québec has adopted a wide range of laws, regulations 
and directives which have adverse effects on the free flow of goods between 
provinces. Many of these complex policies are not fully understood due in 
part to poor documentation and to administrative discretion used in applying 
them fully. 
Different discriminatory measures have been enacted such as provisions 
pertaining to inadequate publicity of the tender6, short time limits7, stringent 
qualification requirements for foreign suppliers8, specifications with respect 
to domestic materials9 and vague criteria for awarding contracts10. 
1.3.2.3. Comparison with the U.S. situation 
As a means to alleviate the economic situation and unemployment, to 
develop local industries and to retaliate against similar protectionist measures 
in other countries tbe United States has also enacted preferential measures for 
domestic products. Not only the federal government but also state governments 
have imposed such non-tariff barriers to trade. In fact, many of the state laws 
have been patterned on the federal model. 
a) Federal Buy-A merican Actu 
Enacted in 1933, the Federal Buy-American Act imposes a Buy-American 
requirement on direct acquisitions of materials by federal agencies or material 
used by private contractors in the construction of federal public works. 
However, this prohibition on the purchase and use of foreign goods is not 
absolute. The Act provides exceptions in cases where it is in the public interest 
to purchase foreign goods, where the domestic cost is unreasonable and 
where the domestic products are not available in sufficient and reasonable 
quantity and of satisfactory quality. The key provision provides as follows : 
6. See Regulation respecting government construction contracts, R.R.Q. 1981, c. A-6, r. 7, 
s. 11. 
7. See Government Supply Contracts Regulation, O.C. 2400-84, 31 October, 1984 Gazette 
Officielle du Québec Part II, Vol. 116, n» 48, p. 3823, s. 13. 
8. See Regulation respecting government service contracts, R.R.Q. 1981, c. A-6, r. 8, s. 5g). 
9. See Modalités d'application de la politique d'achat dans la construction, C.T. 149240 of 
March 13, 1984, s. 1. 
10. See Regulation respecting government construction contracts, R.R.Q. 1981, c. A-6, r. 7, 
s. 23. 
11. 41 U.S.C. § 10a lOd (1976). 
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[...] [U]nless the head of the department [...] concerned shall determine it to be 
inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only such 
unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced 
in the United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and 
supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from 
articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case 
may be, in the United States, shall be acquired for public use. This section shall 
not apply with respect to articles, [...] for use outside the United States, or if 
articles, [...] or the articles, [...] from which they are manufactured [...] in the 
United States [are not available] in sufficient and reasonably available commercial 
quantities and of a satisfactory quality.I2 
b) State Buy-American acts 
The enactment of state Buy-American laws arose out of the same desire 
to relieve a sagging economy, unemployment and to develop domestic 
industries. There exists a widespread use of these preferential policies in bids 
for state government procurement contracts. State preferences can be found 
not only in statutes but also in administrative rules and in individual contract 
requirements. 
Several types of Buy-American provisions can be distinguished. The 
absolute form prohibits any government procurement of foreign-produced 
goods. Price differential or availability and equality of product are not 
impediments to the application of this rule. In Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Board 
of Commissioners ü , a California Buy-American Act which had this effect 
was declared unconstitutional. Usually, state Buy-American policies take the 
limited form which gives preference to domestic products unless it is inconsistent 
with the public interest, the domestic cost is unreasonable or the domestic 
product is not available in the desired quantity and quality. Finally, some 
state preferences are termed limited-specific, the preferential policy being 
applicable only to a given product. 
2. Legality of Protectionist Measures Under a Federal Constitution (Québec, 
Canada and the U.S.) 
As territorial barriers to trade, protectionist policies are an impediment 
to any free trade objectives. Moreover, the legality of these practices is 
arguable under existing constitutional law (section 2) and international 
12. Supra, note 11, section 10a. 
13. 276 Cal. App 2d, 221, 80 Cal Rep. 800 (1969). 
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agreements (section 3). This section proposes to deal first with the legality of 
these measures with respect to a federal constitution. 
Do there exist constitutional limitations on the provincial and state 
power to enact preferential procurement policies? On the whole, these 
policies affect free and competitive trade within the country. The concept of 
federalism implies a sharing of power, exclusive jurisdiction being vested in 
both levels of government according to the constitutional distribution of 
powers. The legality of these state and provincial protectionist measures must 
therefore be examined more specifically with respect to the constitutional 
power over interprovincial trade and with respect to mobility rights and 
equality rights within the country. 
2.1. Interprovincial trade 
The nature of the federal power over interprovincial trade may provide a 
basis for challenging the legality of protectionist procurement policies. As 
barriers to interprovincial trade, these policies have a certain effect upon the 
regulation of interprovincial trade. 
2.1.1. The federal jurisdiction 
Both American and Canadian constitutional texts have vested in their 
respective federal governments power over interprovincial and interstate 
trade. However, judicial interpretation has somewhat restricted this federal 
jurisdiction and granted more latitude to provincial and more even so to state 
governements. 
2.1.1.1. In Canada 
a) The principle 
Subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, confers upon the federal 
parliament the power to make laws in relation to "the regulation of trade and 
commerce". Judicial interpretation has since long confined this federal 
jurisdiction to interprovincial or international trade and commerce and to 
"general trade and commerce"14. Power over intraprovincial trade and 
commerce is vested in the provincial governments in accordance with subsection 
92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which confers provincial power over 
"property and civil rights". 
14. Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Parsons, (1881-82) 7 App. Cas. 96. 
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b) The restrictions 
A provincial statute in relation to subsection 92(13) will not be invalidated 
if it incidentally affects interprovincial trade.I5 Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether the pith and substance of the act is related to a provincial 
power and merely affects incidentally interprovincial trade and commerce or 
whether it pertains to interprovincial trade and commerce. 
2.1.1.2. In the U.S. 
a) The principle 
The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution l6 authorizes Congress to 
"regulate Commerce [...] among the several States [...]". As the main source 
of congressional regulatory power over commerce, this clause also implicitly 
restricts state legislative power. However, it has been left to the courts to 
interpret the scope of permissible state regulation particularly in the absence 
of congressional legislation. Extreme interpretations have been rejected. In 
general, if the regulation related more to a state interest than constituting a 
burden to interstate commerce, the court will uphold the state legislation l7. 
b) The restrictions 
State courts have recognized a zone of immunity from commerce clause 
attack for states acting in a "proprietary capacity"18. In fact, states acting as 
buyer or seller of goods or services like private businesses may substantially 
affect interstate commerce. According to the proprietary action doctrine, 
states like any other individuals or businesses have a right to choose their 
business partners without being hampered by commerce clause restraints. 
2.1.2. Application to protectionist procurement policies 
In light of the federal power over interprovincial and interstate trade and 
the judicial limitations added to this jurisdiction in favour of the states, it is 
15. Carnation Co. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board, [1968] R.C.S. 238. 
16. U.S. Constitution, a. 1, s. 8, cl. 3. 
17. See Nibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I ( 1824) ; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299 (1851). 
18. See City of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo, 329 ; 266 P. 214(1928); Tribune Printing & Binding 
Ca. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591 ; 75 N.W. 904 (1898). 
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important to examine how the courts have interpreted the legality of protectionist 
procurement policies. The objective sought by these policies and their impact 
upon federal jurisdiction has yet to be considered. 
2.1.2.1. In Canada 
The Canadian constitution is silent as to provincial governmental purchases. 
In general, the provincial government has the power to conclude contracts 
with whomever it pleases. Subsection 92(13) which confers provincial jurisdiction 
over "Property and Civil Rights in the Province" is the habilitating provision. 
The regulation of intraprovincial trade comes within the ambit of this section. 
However, as barriers to trade, preferential procurement policies exceed 
the scope of intraprovincial trade and may encroach upon the federal power 
over interprovincial trade. The constitutionality of these policies has not yet 
been challenged in courts. The administrative nature of these policies does 
not prompt judicial determination. Nevertheless, the late chief justice Laskin's 
obiter in Re Agricultural Products Marketing19 raises a doubt as to the 
constitutionality of these policies : 
[•••] [T]he federal trade and commerce power also operates as a brake on 
provincial legislation which may seek to protect its producers or manufacturers 
against entry of goods from other Provinces. 
2.1.2.2. In the U.S. 
The constitutional validity of state Buy-American restrictions remains 
unresolved. The United States Supreme Court has been silent on the matter 
but state court decisions have directly addressed the issue. However, Supreme 
Court decisions on state acts impairing trade and the proprietary action 
doctrine with respect to the commerce clause have influenced the outcome of 
these cases. 
a) State acts impairing trade 
The Supreme Court has relied on the commerce clause to invalidate state 
legislation which impairs interstate commerce20. Under the balancing test, 
state regulations will be struck down if the consequences for interstate 
commerce are greater than the local benefits or if less restrictive measures 
could have been used to achieve the same ends. 
19. [1978]2S.C.R. 1198, p. 1267. 
20. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), p. 142. 
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b) State's immunity from the commerce clause restraints 
when acting in a proprietary capacity 
State courts have determined that states purchasing goods and 
contracting for services have the same rights as other businesses to choose 
their contracting partners and therefore enjoy an immunity from commerce 
clause attack. 
In American Yearbook Co. v. Askew21, a publisher engaged in the 
business of printing yearbooks for schools and universities but lacking 
printing facilities in Florida was prevented from obtaining a contract to print 
yearbooks for state-owned universities. A Florida statued required that "all 
public printing of this state shall be done in the state [...]22. The publisher 
challenged this statute on the basis of the commerce clause restraints. 
The federal district court applied the proprietary action doctrine to this 
case and dismissed any commerce clause attack. Despite out-of-state discrim-
ination, the court ruled that the state acting in a proprietary capacity could 
impose conditions upon its purchases and thereby exclude companies who do 
not perform their printing in Florida. 
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers13, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld an executive order issued by Boston 
mayor White which provided that Boston residents perform at least 50% of 
the work on city-financed construction projects. As a major participant in the 
construction project it wholly funded,, the city was acting in a proprietary 
capacity rather than as a market regulator. Although, the executive order 
required private contractors to hire a certain percentage of city residents and 
therefore appeared to regulate parties not dealing directly with the city, the 
latter was sufficiently involved in the project to benefit from the market 
participant exemption. 
2.1.3. Impact upon protectionist procurement policies 
Since Canadian courts have not yet dealt with the validity of provincial 
preferential purchasing policies, American judicial interpretation is of valuable 
interest. Adapted to the Canadian context, American decisions dealing with 
the issue will provide a guideline. Under the traditional balancing test, 
21. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) afTd 409 U.S. 904(1972). 
22. FLT. STAT. ANN., s. 283.03 (West 1974). 
23. 460 U.S. 204 (1983); see also Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hugues v. 
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
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provincial preferential purchasing policies which unreasonably burden the 
flow of interprovincial goods notwithstanding inexistant federal regulation 
should be held unconstitutional. However, the proprietary action doctrine 
provides provincial governments discriminating in favour of their citizens in 
markets of their own creation, with an immunity. In fact, a province acting as 
a market participant could, as a valid exercise of its police power, substantially 
affect interprovincial trade. In order to delineate the scope of the market 
participant exemption, one should refer to the United States Supreme Court 
decision in South Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke24 and transpose it 
to the Canadian context : 
The market-participant doctrine permits a State to influence "a discrete, 
identifiable class of economic activity in which [it] is a major participant". [...] 
the doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the 
economic power to dictate, and does not validate any requirement merely 
because the State imposes it upon someone with whom it is in contractual 
privity. 
Subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 is a strong argument for 
the invalidation of provincial barriers. Preferential procurement policies 
attempt partially to deal with economic union problems. Such a matter 
should be left to the federal parliament. Not only are they a significant barrier 
to economic integration within a federal country but they also offend 
individual economic rights, namely the right to mobility within a country. 
2.2. Mobility rights 
Within a democratic society, the right to move, to work and to take up 
residence is not only of economic importance but above all a fundamental 
right to the freedom of any person. By discriminating against out-of-province 
or out-of-state suppliers, preferential procurement policies are an impediment 
to mobility and consequently to greater integration. Suppliers are not free to 
move and work anywhere within the country. In that respect, the nature and 
extent of mobility rights may form the basis to challenge preferential procure-
ment policies. 
2.2.1. The federal jurisdiction 
Mobility rights are constitutionally guaranteed both in the United States 
and Canada. They constitute a fundamental right to live and work anywhere 
in the country. However, these rights may conflict with provincial and state 
24. 467 U.S. 82(1984), p. 97. 
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objectives for the greater well-being of local residents and for local industrial 
development. The desire to strengthen these economies through preferential 
policies also conflicts with federal policies of national economic integration. 
Before considering the legality of protectionist measures with respect to 
mobility rights, the meaning and scope of these rights must be examined. 
2.2.1.1. In Canada 
a) The general rule : subsection 6(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 
Section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
mobility rights to all Canadians. Subsection 6(2) states the general rule which 
concerns this paper : 
(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of permanent 
resident of Canada has the right 
a) to move to and take up residence in any province ; and 
b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. 
Subsection 6(2) grants a constitutional right to citizens and to permanent 
residents of Canada. As defined in the Canadian Citizenship Act25 and the 
Immigration Act26, these terms are confined to natural persons. Consequently, 
corporations would therefore be excluded from the right set out in section 
627. However, if the term permanent resident is not defined according to the 
technical Immigration Act definition, a broader interpretation of subsection 
6(2) could benefit corporations. In a few recent cases pertaining to other 
constitutional rights, the courts have considered corporations as "persons"28. 
Furthermore, for income tax purposes, corporations are considered residents 
on the basis of their incorporation in Canada or the control held by Canadian 
citizens. By relying on other charter rights interpretations and income tax 
case-law, the term "permanent resident" could therefore encompass 
corporations. 
25. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19. 
26. R.S.C. 1970, c. [-2. 
27. Groupe des éleveurs de volailles de l'est de l'Ontario v. Can. Chicken Marketing Agency, 
(1987) 20 Admin. L.R. 91 (F.C. T.D.). 
28. Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.CR. 145 (applying s. 8 at suit of corporation); R. v. Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] I S.CR. 295 (applying s. 2 at suit of corporation) ; R. v. Videoflicks 
Zjf/.,(1984)48 0.R. (2d) 395 (Ont. CA.) (applying s. 2 at suit of corporation). 
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b) Limits to the general rule 
— Subsection 6(3)(a) : Laws or practices of general application/Discrimination 
primarily on the basis of province of residence. 
Subsection 6(3)(a) provides a limitation on the rights enacted in subsection 
6(2). It states : 
(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to 
a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other 
than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of 
province of present or previous residence ; [...] 
Subsection 6(3)(a) operates as an exception to subsection (2) if two 
conditions are met. First, the restriction to subsection 6(2) rights must be 
enclosed in a law or practice of general application in force in a province. This 
expression is broad enough to include any form of government action29. 
Secondly, the restrictions to subsection 6(2) rights must not discriminate 
primarily on the basis of province of residence. However, if the restrictions 
are related to a legitimate purpose of provincial concern which does not 
discriminate primarily on the basis of extra-provincial residence, then they 
will be upheld. Discrimination consists of any type of differential treatment. 
Discrimination primarily on the basis of the province of residence will 
constitute aprima facie violation of subsection (2). However, under section 1 
of the Charter, the proof that the restriction prescribed by law is reasonable 
and "[...] can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" will 
save the statute. 
— Subsection 6(4) 
Subsection (4) provides as follows : 
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that 
has as its object the amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals 
in that province who are socially or economically disadvantaged if the rate 
of employment in that province is below the rate of employment in Canada. 
In the absence of a mechanism providing for the determination of the 
rate of employment, Statistics Canada monthly Labour Force Surveys 
should be relied upon. On that basis, a majority of the provinces would be 
allowed to establish affirmative action programs30. 
29. See Malartic Hygrade Gold Mines (Québec) Ltdc. R. (Québec), [1982] C S . 1146; (1982) 
142 D.L.R. (3d) 512. 
30. J.B. LASKIN, "Mobility Rights under the Charter", (1982), 4 Supreme Court L.R. 89. 
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2.2.1.2. In the U.S. 
a) The interstate privileges and immunities clause 
The most significant constitutional source for protection of mobility 
rights in the United States is found in article 4 section 2 of the United States 
Constitution which provides as follows : 
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States. 
— Interpretation 
The privileges and immunities clause insures that citizens travelling to 
one state are conferred the same rights possessed by the citizens ofthat state. 
State legislation discriminating against out-of-state citizens is subject to the 
privileges and immunities clause attack. The clause was also designed to 
strengthen unity among states and to prevent the development of an independent 
union of states. As stated by Chief Justice Vinson, "The primary purpose of 
this clause, [...] was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, 
sovereign States"31. 
— Scope 
The right to interstate mobility is not an absolute freedom. It guarantees 
the right to "[...] travel throughout the length and breadth of our land 
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or 
restrict this movement" and to "[...] migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start 
a new life [...]"12. The clause also protects the right of citizens to seek 
employment in any state without being restricted by unreasonably discriminatory 
measures33. 
— The special case of corporations 
Artificial entities such as corporations do not benefit from the protection 
granted by this clause34. The term "citizens" applies to natural persons but 
31. Tommerv. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), p. 395. 
32. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), p. 629. 
33. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall 418(1871). 
34. Paulv. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Bank of A ugusla v. Eale, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
519,586(1839). 
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not to artificial persons. In fact, corporations are created by the legislature 
and therefore are granted special privileges. They owe their existence to the 
state law and therefore cannot claim recognition beyond the territory where 
they were created. Consequently, states are entitled to discriminate against 
out-of-state corporations since the application of the privileges and immunities 
clause does not extend to corporations. 
— The test to be applied under Art. IV section 2 : "a two-step analysis" 
The first step is to determine whether the legislation affects a privilege or 
immunity protected under article 4. Not all forms of discrimination are 
secured by this provision. As stated by Justice Blackmun in Baldwin v. Fish 
and Game Commission of Montana : 
Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact 
that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted ; other 
distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or 
the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those 
"privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single 
entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.iS 
The second part of the test must also be met to invalidate a discriminatory 
measure. The protection granted by article 4 is not absolute. A legislation will 
be upheld if there is a "[...] reasonable relationship between the danger 
represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the [...] discrimination practiced 
upon them"36. Consequently, not only must the state establish that non-
residents constitute a particular source of evil but also that the legislation is 
substantially related to this evil. 
2.2.2. Application of the principle 
It is interesting to examine how both Canadian and American courts 
have dealt with the mobility rights issue. Judicial interpretation is essential to 
delineate these rights and thus measure their impact upon provincial and state 
legislation. As such mobility rights are fundamental, a liberal or narrow 
interpretation of their scope will determine the validity of various legislations 
which constitute an impediment to mobility. 
35. 435 U.S. 371 (1978), p. 383. 
36. Toomerv. Witsell, supra, note 31, p. 399. 
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2.2.2.1. In Canada 
a) Statutory enactments 
Provincial preferential purchasing policies unquestionably impede inter-
provincial mobility. These policies appear in statutes, regulations enacted 
pursuant to them, and in directives of internal management. Provinces often 
regulate government procurement by discriminating against out-of-province 
residents. 
b) Cases and comments 
— Under subsections 6(2) and (3)(a) of the Charter 
In Basile v. A.G. of Nova Scotia31, an encyclopedia salesman from the 
province of Québec was denied a direct seller's lience on the ground that the 
Nova Scotia Direct Sellers'Licensing and Regulation Act required a salesman 
to be a permanent resident of Nova Scotia to obtain such a licence. The court 
ruled that the regulation violated subsection 6(2) of the Canadian Charter. By 
preventing non-residents from carrying on business as direct sellers in Nova 
Scotia, the statute breached the right to interprovincial mobility. Furthermore, 
subsection 6(3)(a) did not save the legislation since it was not a law of general 
application. On the contrary, it applied specifically to one group, namely 
non-residents. 
In the Demaere case38, an air traffic controller from Fort St. John was 
excluded from a position in Vancouver since he did not reside in the area 
where the position was offered. By virtue of paragraph 3(a) of the Public 
Service Employment Act39, the Public Service Commission was authorized 
to determine the area of residence of a candidate in order to be eligible for a 
position. The competition was therefore closed to those who did not reside in 
the Pacific region. Fort St. John is located in the north-western region. 
The court upheld the legislation on the basis of subsection 6(3)(a). The 
Public Service Employment Act was held to be a law of general application. 
Federal laws come within the purview of this provision. Furthermore, the 
statute did not discriminate primarily on the basis of the province of residence 
37. (1983) 148 D.L.R. (3d) 382 (N.S.S.C), p. 384, inf. at 62 N.S.R. (2d) 4I0(N.S.C.A.), p. 415. 
38. Demaere v. Canada, (1984) 52 N.R. 288. 
39. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32. 
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but rather on the basis of employment in a region. This interpretation is 
arguable since it drastically narrows the scope of section 6. Discrimination 
affecting out-of-province residents will be upheld if the impugned legislation 
discriminates on a basis other than the province of residence. The effect upon 
out-of-province residents may however be the same. 
— Under subsection 6(4) of the Charter 
The short-lived history of the Canadian Charter has not yet brought 
before the courts the issue of affirmative programs with respect to mobility 
rights. Subsection 6(4) excludes from subsection 6(2) certain affirmative 
action programs. However, the type of affirmative action programs contem-
plated by this provision has yet to be determined. 
2.2.2.2. In the U.S. 
American courts possess an extensive experience in the interpretation of 
mobility rights under article IV section 2 of the United States Constitution. 
Judicial interpretation is therefore significant and has fashioned the latitude 
of states to interfere with mobility. 
a) Statutory enactments 
Discriminatory impediments to mobility are widespread in employment 
preference statutes. Some statutes provide preferential treatment to state or 
city residents for employment by state or municipal governments. Other 
statutes require that private contractors create a hiring preference for resident 
state or city workers. 
Such employment preference measures are subject to article IV section 2 
scrutiny. Employment is a basic and essential activity. Courts have already 
stated that the privileges and immunities clauses prevent "[...] a State from 
imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other States in their pursuit of 
common callings within the State [...]"40. The scope of this clause is also 
broader than that of the commerce clause. Legislation is therefore subject to 
closer scrutiny under the former. 
40. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, supra, note 35. 
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b) Cases 
In United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County 
and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden41, an ordinance of 
the City of Camden, adopted in conformity with the New Jersey statutory 
provisions, required that all city contractors and subcontractors hire at least 
40% of their employees from Camden residents. The court ruled that these 
provisions violated the privileges and immunities clause even though the 
discrimination was based on municipal as opposed to state residency42. In-
state residents not living in the City who are similarly disadvantaged have no 
claim under this clause ; they can always voice their disapproval at state 
elections. This fact does not prevent out-of-state residents from seeking a 
remedy under article 443. 
Finally, consideration must be given to the Hicklin v. Orbeck44 case. The 
Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action program, the "Alaska 
Hire" law, which required that all Alaska oil and gas leases contain a 
provision that qualified Alaska residents be employed by preference to non-
residents. The court ruled that the statute did not bear a substantial relationship 
to the evil to be eliminated. In fact, assuming that a state may alleviate its 
unemployment problem by requiring private employers to hire in-state 
residents, the present unemployment problem was not due to out-of-state 
residents seeking employment in Alaska. The unemployment of in-state 
residents was due rather to their lack of education and job training and their 
remoteness from job opportunities. Moreover, even if the "Alaska Hire" law 
was aimed at eliminating an evil caused by non-residents, the statute would 
still be unconstitutional since the statutory employment preference is not 
given only to Alaska's unemployed but to all in-state residents. 
2.2.3. Impact upon protectionist procurement policies 
United States constitutional law is a profitable source for the interpretation 
of entrenched mobility rights in Canada. American constitutional texts and 
judicial interpretation offer an important guideline which could be used by 
the Canadian courts as a historical background to the interpretation of 
section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
41. (1984)52 U.S. Law Week 4187, 465 U.S. 208(1984). 
42. Id.,-p. 220. 
43. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, supra, note 35. 
44. 437 U.S. 518(1978). 
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The twofold test applied by Justice Rehnquist in the Camden case45 
could be usefully transposed for the purpose of subsection 6(2) and 6(3) of the 
Canadian Charter. In this respect, considering that not all forms of discrimi-
nation are constitutionally suspect, Canadian courts should therefore determine 
whether the legislation breaches a fundamental right guaranteed by section 6. 
However, such discriminatory legislation will not violate section 6 unless the 
legislation bears a substantial relationship to the evil sought to be eliminated. 
The last part of this test requires a close examination of the impugned 
legislation, of its scope and rationale. 
With respect to subsection 6(4), the American case of Hicklin v. Orbeck46 
is of interest. In line with the court's reasoning, a provincial employment 
preference policy would have to benefit the unemployed and not all of the in-
province residents to come within the purview of subsection 6(4). An affirmative 
action program must necessarily be aimed at helping the socially and 
economically deprived citizens of the province. It is not sufficient to simply 
grant an employment preference to all residents. The policy must bear a 
substantial relationship to job promotion for the province's unemployed who 
may often lack job training and education. 
2.3. Equality rights 
Equality rights are fundamental to any democratic society. Governmental 
action must therefore respect the right of every individual to equal treatment. 
Consequently, preferential procurement policies may be illegal in that they 
are directly aimed at creating a different treatment between citizens of a 
country. The legality of these policies depends upon the nature and scope of 
equality rights in a country. 
2.3.1. The principle of equality 
The right to equal treatment before and under the law has been entrenched 
in the Canadian constitution through the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The short-lived history of the Charter provides little judicial 
interpretation of this right. The United States Constituton and its equal 
protection clause can therefore constitute a helpful guideline to interpreting 
the Canadian equality clause. 
45. Supra, note 41. 
46. Supra, note 44. 
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2.3.1.1. In Canada 
a) Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter provides as follows : 
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law [...] and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability. 
Not only does section 15 offer protection against the unequal application 
of the law but it also protects against any type of law which discriminates on 
the basis of equality. Section 15 has therefore a wide application. 
b) Broad interpretation 
The application of subsection 15(1) is not limited to the types of 
discrimination enumerated in that section ; it is a general equality clause. The 
use of the words "[...] in particular [...]" favours this broad interpretation of 
the grounds of discrimination. Other grounds such as preferential employment 
treatment for provincial residents would also be subject to section 15 scrutiny. 
c) "Individual" 
Section 15 applies to every "individual". Originally, the term "every one" 
had been used but was later substituted for "individual". It is believed that this 
substitution may indicate an intention to exclude the application of section 15 
to corporations. Professor Hogg4 7 supports this position which was also 
adopted in a few recent cases48. 
However, the French version of section 15 lends itself well to a broad 
interpretation benefiting corporations. In fact, considering the term "personne" 
used in the French version and the liberal interpretation adopted with respect 
47. P. Ho«., Constitutional Law of Canada, 2 nd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1985, p. 798. 
48. Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v. A.G. Can., (1985) 7 C.P.R. (3d) 145 
(F.C.T.D.), 192 (p. 67 of the french translation), affirmed by (1986) 34 D.L.R. (4>h) 584 
(F.C.A.): it should be noted that the issued relating to the interpretation of the word 
"individual" under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter has not been raised before the 
Federal Court of Appeal; Surrey Credit Union v. Mendonca, Mendonca and Union 
Electric Supply Co. Ltd, (1985) 67 B.C.L.R. 310 (B.C.S.C), p. 311 ; Mund v. Medicine 
Hal, (1986)67 A.R. II ; Milk Board v. Clearview Dairy Farm Inc., (1987) 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) 
116 (CA.). 
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to section 15, any doubt may be resolved in favour of an application of this 
provision to corporations49. 
d) Affirmative action 
Subsection 15(2) provides that: 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
2.3.1.2. In the U.S. 
The United States has over a hundred years of experience in the 
interpretation of equality rights. To the extent that certain similarities exist 
between these Canadian and American rights, the American case-law can 
certainly benefit Canadian courts in their interpretation of section 15. 
a) The equal protection clause (Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the 
Constitution 
Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the Constitution provides that : 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
b) Textual differences between the Canadian and American Equality 
guarantees 
The American and Canadian texts pertaining to equality rights differ in 
four significant ways. First, the 14th Amendment does not contain a specific 
mention of equality benefits as section 15 does. 
49. MilkBoardv. Clearview Dairy Farm Inc., (1986)69 B.C. L.R. 220, p. 245 (Justice Toy) ; see 
also with respect to applicability of other provisions to corporations, supra, note 28. But see 
Société United Docks v. Government of Mauritius, [1985] 1 A.C. 585, where the Privy 
Council held that the word "individual" included corporations, when used in a constitutional 
provision. 
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Secondly, the 14th Amendment is silent with respect to affirmative action 
programs. American courts have therefore had to elaborate criteria for the 
determination of the legality of affirmative action programs. Consequently, 
the United States Supreme Court has required these programs to have 
substantial relationship, as opposed to a rational relationship, to a legitimate 
state objective. Affirmative action programs are explicitly mentioned in 
subsection 15(2) of the Canadian Charter. However, the provision imposes a 
lesser standard of review, namely a rational relationship standard. 
Thirdly, the 14th Amendment does not indicate what types of restrictions 
are discriminatory and unconstitutional. The courts have had to elaborate a 
test to determine the validity of certain distinctions. The Canadian context is 
however different. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter serves as a guideline by 
limiting the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. Therefore, 
limitations on equality rights, prescribed by law, will be upheld, notwithstanding 
a prima facie violation of section 15, if they are reasonable and can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
In view of these textual differences, American cases should be referred to 
with circumspection for the interpretation of Canadian equality rights. 
However, the extensive judicial interpretation of the American equal rights 
clause is a formidable resource. In fact, American case-law should be viewed 
as a primary source for Canadian courts for defining equality rights. 
c) Three possible tests to be applied 
The United States Supreme Court has developed three standards of 
judicial review in its analysis of equal rights. 
— Strict scrutiny standard 
The strict scrutiny standard is used when a fundamental right such as the 
right to vote or to interstate travel is violated or a suspect classification is used 
such as race. The government must establish that the classification was 
justified by a "compelling state interest" and that no other means were 
available. Because such a heavy burden is placed upon government, there is 
practically a per se rule of unconstitutionality of such legislation. 
— Minimal scrutiny standard 
Laws that are not "suspect" and do not affect a fundamental right are 
subject to the minimal scrutiny standard. This test simply requires that the 
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impugned law bear a rational relationship to the objective sought to be 
accomplished. Economic legislation is often subject to this test of minimal 
scrutiny. 
— Intermediate scrutiny standard 
Recently the United States Supreme Court has developed an intermediate 
scrutiny test which offers a more flexible standard than the strict scrutiny 
standard but still requires that the law bear a "substantial relationship" to an 
"important government objective". This test is aimed at classifications which 
are not suspect but which are too important to be subjected to only a minimal 
scrutiny standard, such as classifications by sex. 
This test was adopted in Craig v. Boren50 where the Supreme Court 
struck down an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to 
men under 21 and women under 18 to prevent road accidents due to 
drunkenness. This position was supported by statistics indicating a higher 
percentage of alcohol related car accidents by young men than young women. 
Although this evidence would have been sufficient to uphold the law under a 
minimal scrutiny standard, the court was more severe and struck down the 
law on the ground that it failed to meet the intermediate scrutiny test. 
d) "Persons" includes corporations 
Articifial entities such as corporations can claim the benefit of the equal 
protection clause. The term "person" used in the 14th Amendment clearly 
includes corporations51. 
2.3.2. Application of the principle 
2.3.2.1. Section 1 and section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
Different means are used by the provincial governments to provide 
preferential treatment to in-province suppliers in their grant of contracts. 
Thus, governments may impose performance requirements suited to the 
50. 429 U.S. 190(1976). 
51. Convington and L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 ( 1896) ; Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466 (1897) ; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 578 (1896) ; 
Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936); First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotli, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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capability of local producers or resort to pre-established lists from which an 
out-of-province supplier may find some difficulty to be added to or provide a 
pricing advantage to in-province bids or finally grant a preference to goods 
having a high provincial content. 
These distinctions providing for employment preferences to in-province 
residents constitute clearly a primafacie violation of section 15. Nevertheless, 
such a policy may be upheld under section 1 of the Canadian Charter if the 
distinction prescribed by law is a reasonable one and can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter 
provides that : 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits [...] as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The onus rests on the government. However to bring about the application 
of section 1, the government must prove that the measure is prescribed by law. 
The act must therefore be authorized under the law to claim the application of 
section 1. According to the European Court of Human Rights52, the phrase 
"prescribed by law" imposes a double requirement. First, the law must be 
adequately accessible to the public. Furthermore, it must be formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct by it. A 
statute, a regulation or a by-law enacted in accordance with statutory 
provisions as well as common law are within the purview of section 1 " . 
However, directives and guidelines which are not officially published delegated 
legislation do not qualify as "law" for the purpose of section 1 unless they are 
binding upon the officials to whom they apply54. 
Preferential procurement policies adopted by the provinces may not 
therefore meet the requirement standards set out in the case-law. Most of 
these policies are not contained in statutes or regulations but rather in 
directives or guidelines. Governments may not therefore rely on section 1 to 
save these policies. A prima facie finding of discrimination under section 15 
should suffice to invalidate them. 
52. Sunday Times v. Uniled Kingdom, (1979) 2 European Human Rights Reports 245. 
53. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. 
54. Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors, (1984) 45 
O.R. (2d) 80 (Ont. CA.). In this case, standards contained in a pamphlet published by the 
Ontario's Board of Censors did not qualify as law under section 1. Even though the 
standards provided useful indications to a film maker as to the appreciation of the film, they 
had no legal force and were not binding on the Board. 
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2.3.2.2. Subsection 15(1) 
The case-law with respect to subsection 15(1) is scarce and prompts us to 
refer to the American case-law as a guide to interpreting Canadian equality 
rights. However, the textual differences referred to earlier55 must be understood 
and borne in mind. A Canadian author, Neil Finkelstein, opines that 
Canadian courts should adopt the minimum scrutiny test with respect to 
economic regulation whereas the strict scrutiny test should prevail in matters 
of suspect classifications. However, matters which are important but do not 
involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications must be considered with 
circumspection56. The minimum scrutiny standard appears not only inadequate 
in this instance in view of the American case of Craig v. Boren57 but also in 
view of section 1 of the Canadian Charter which imposes a considerably 
higher standard of judicial review. 
Consideration should be given to the American case of Galesburg 
Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees5*. Shortly after its incorporation 
under the laws of Wyoming, Galesburg Corporation was refused a construction 
contract although it was the lowest hidder on the basis that it did not qualify 
as a resident under section 9-8-301 of the Wyoming Statute which required a 
year of residency. Since the bid of the new lowest bidder, a resident, had not 
exceeded the bid of Gasleburg by more than 5 %, the contract was awarded to 
this resident as directed by section 9-8-302 of the Wyoming Statute. 
The majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to apply the strict 
scrutiny standard to section 9-8-302 since fundamental rights such as the right 
to travel and vote do not extend to corporations under the 14th Amendment. 
Furthermore, Galesburg was not a member of a suspect class since such status 
has never been extended to corporations. Applying therefore the minimum 
scrutiny test, the court held that the purpose of the statute to "encourage local 
industry" was a legitimate state interest. By increasing the possibility that 
contracts will be awarded to Wyoming resident bidders, the statute is also 
rationally related to the advancement of this state interest. Justice Rooney, 
dissenting, considered however that the minimum scrutiny standard had not 
being met. State interest in encouraging local industry was not furthered since 
long-time Wyoming residents incorporated within the year prior to the 
bidding were kept from doing business. 
55. See Section 2.3.1.2. b). 
56. N. FINKELSTEIN, "Sections 1 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
the Relevance of the U.S. Experience", (1985) 6 Advocates' Quarterly 188, p. 200. 
57. Supra, note 50. 
58. 641 P. (2d) 745 (Wyo. 1982). 
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2.3.2.3. Subsection 15(2) 
The American courts remain unsettled as to the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs with respect to racial minorities under the equal 
protection clause. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke59, the 
U.S. Supreme Court quashed by a majority of 5 to 4 an affirmative action 
program to help racial minorities in university admissions. Applying the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, the court held that a public university may 
consider race as a factor in admitting students to medical school and may give 
positive weight to an individual applicant's membership in a racial minority, 
but may not impose a quota system excluding candidates on the basis of race. 
The issue has never been raised under the Canadian Charter. However, 
in a case arising under the Canadian Bill of Rights, Justice Ritchie opined that 
affirmative action programs providing employment preference for native 
people would not violate Alberta's human rights legislation60. In fact, 
affirmative action programs are constitutionally valid as long as they remain 
within the ambit of subsection 15(2) of the Canadian Charter. 
The Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in Manitoba Rice Farmers 
Association v. Human Rights Commission61 appears to be one of the first 
Canadian courts to have dealt with the issue of subsection 15(2). In this case, 
the Manitoba Human Rights Commission had approved a department of 
natural resources special "affirmative action" program under section 9 of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act granting to certain indians a first option to 
licence new and surrendered areas for the purpose of growing and harvesting 
wild rice. An association of wild rice growers applied for certiorarito have the 
commission's decision quashed. The court ruled that the program violated 
subsection 15(1) since non-indian citizens of Manitoba were discriminated 
against and treated unequally. Nevertheless, subsection 15(2) creates an 
exception to the general rule. To save the program, the Commission must 
prove that it falls within the scope of subsection 15(2), by analogy with section 
1 of the Charter. The court ordered a retrial to determine the validity of the 
program under subsection 15(2). 
In a subsequent decision62, the Court held that the program was not 
saved by subsection 15(2) since it was not likely to enhance the situation of the 
disadvantaged group, while causing prejudice to the white farmers. The real 
59. 438 U.S. 265(1978). 
60. Athabasca Tribal Council v. Amoco Canada, [1981] I S.C.R. 699. 
61. (1985)37 Man. R. (2d) 50. 
62. Apsil v. Man. Human Rights Comm., Court of Queen's Bench, Manitoba, november 16, 
1987. 
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obstacles that the Indians encountered were lack of funds and technical 
expertise to harvest wild rice. The mere granting of licences would not remedy 
these obstacles. 
2.3.3. Impact upon protectionist procurement policies 
American case-law is of limited application to the Canadian context. 
The interaction of sections 1 and 15 of the Charter prompts Canadian courts 
to develop their own interpretation of equality rights. However, American 
judicial interpretation of the permissible scope of legislative classifications 
and the standards established to this end are undoubtedly of valuable 
assistance to developing a principle of equality and a method for the 
resolution of equality rights issues. 
In respect to the interpretation of the 14th Amendment and to sections 1 
and 15 of the Canadian Charter, Canadian courts could follow the Galesburg 
decision63 and adopt the minimal scrutiny standard to economic regulation 
such as provincial preferential purchasing policies. The latter will likely be 
considered constitutional since they pursue a legitimate provincial interest 
and the preference given to resident bidders is rationally related to that 
interest. 
However, Canadian courts may refuse to follow the minimum scrutiny 
standard and prefer to rely on the test stated at section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter. A preferential policy must therefore represent a reasonable limit 
which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This test 
requires a higher degree of scrutiny which could possibly result in the 
invalidation of these policies. 
Moreover, the government must beforehand prove that the policies are 
prescribed by law before applying this test of reasonability. Unless these 
policies are enacted in a statute, a regulation or a by-law passed within the 
enacting body's legislative jurisdiction, they will not benefit from section 1. In 
view of the case of the Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society64, a 
directive or a guideline issued by government departments or agencies does 
not qualify as "law" for the purpose of section 1. Consequently, even 
assuming that preferential policies are reasonable and demonstrably justified, 
most of them are outside section l's coverage since they are not legally 
authorized. 
63. Supra, note 58. 
64. Supra, note 54. 
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3. Legality of Protectionist Measures and International Law 
The distortion in international trade resulting from government preferential 
purchasing policies has become more and more apparent over the years. 
These policies favour the development of domestic markets while closing 
procurement to foreign tenders. The impact of these policies upon international 
trade prompts us to consider their legality with respect to international 
relations (section 3.1.). Federal jurisdiction over international relations 
imposes limitations upon provincial governments' ability to regulate their 
own economy. Furthermore, international agreements impose upon signatory 
countries obligations which must be respected. The nature of these obligations 
and their applicability to the relevant jurisdictions within a federal country 
will determine the legality under international law of preferential procurement 
policies (section 3.2.). 
3.1. Federal jurisdiction in matters of international trade and commerce 
The validity of preferential measures for products within the province 
over those produced in other provinces is distinct from the issue of the validity 
of preferential measures for goods and services produced within the province 
over those produced in other countries. Interprovincial preference policies 
have already been discussed (see 2.1.). This section purports to examine the 
validity of the latter type of policies under the federal power in matters of 
international trade and commerce (3.1.1.) and under the federal power to 
conduct foreign affairs (3.1.2.). 
3.1.1. Federal power in matters of international trade and commerce 
Provincial governments' procurement policies are a simple exercise of 
their power to contract. However, these policies could be challenged in view 
of the federal jurisdiction over international trade and commerce. Provincial 
governments as regulators of their economy may infringe on federal powers 
by awarding preference to in-province suppliers and consequently by discrim-
inating against international suppliers. 
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3.1.1.1. The principle 
1) In Canada 
a) Federal jurisdiction 
Subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, confers upon the federal 
parliament the power to make laws in relation to "The Regulation of Trade 
and Commerce". 
b) Interpretation 
Judicial interpretation has limited the scope of the commerce power 
under subsection 91(2). The Privy Council in Citizens' Insurance Co. v. 
Parsons65 while acknowledging the provincial power over intraprovincial 
trade and commerce under the "Property and Civil Rights in the Province" 
power (subsection 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867) confined the federal 
power to interprovincial and international trade and commerce and to 
general trade and commerce. 
c) Application 
Courts must carefully examine the pith and substance of the statute to 
determine if it is within the legislature's jurisdiction. Furthermore, an incidental 
effect upon a federal power is not sufficient to invalidate a legislation enacted 
within the provincial government's legislative jurisdiction. 
In Central Canada Potash v. Government of Saskatchewan66, the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down a statute rationing and fixing the 
price of potash which the government of Saskatchewan claimed were conser-
vation and management measures within provincial jurisdiction. The court 
held that the pith and substance of the law was rather aimed at fixing and 
controlling the international and interprovincial price of the product and thus 
intruded upon the federal jurisdiction over interprovincial and international 
trade and commerce under subsection 91(2). 
65. (1881-82)7 App. Cas. 96. 
66. [1979] I S.C.R. 42. 
404 Les Cahiers de Droit (1988) 29 C. de D. 369 
2) In the U.S. 
a) The commerce clause 
Article 1 section 8 clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress 
to "[...] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes". 
b) Interpretation of the commerce clause 
The commerce clause grants to Congress power over both foreign and 
interstate commerce. Although these powers are conferred by the same clause 
and in the same terms and despite early authority to the contrary67, modern 
decisions indicate that the states are subject to greater limitations and closer 
scrutiny with respect to international commerce than to interstate commerce68. 
3.1.1.2. Application of the principle 
1) In Canada 
Provincial preferential purchasing policies have not yet been the subject 
of judicial interpretation under the federal power over interprovincial and 
international trade and commerce. The administrative nature of these policies 
do not lend themselves well to judicial scrutiny. However, the constitutionality 
of preferential policies has frequently been litigated in the United States. The 
American courts' handling of the issue and practical approach will certainly 
serve as a valuable guideline. 
2) In the U.S. 
More than half the state governments have developed preferential 
purchasing policies that favour in-state goods over foreign goods. Many 
litigations have arisen under the foreign commerce clause as a result of 
unsuccessful contract bids by foreigners. 
In KSB Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply 
Commission of N.J.69, the respondent commission, a government agency, 
67. Thurlowv. Massachusetts,46U.S.(5 Hav.) 504,(1847) p. 578 ; Pittsburghand S. Coal Co. 
v. Bales, 156 U.S. 577 (1895), p. 587. 
68. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States 289 U.S. 48, ( 1933),p. 59 ; Bob-
Lo Excursion Co. v. People of Stale of Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948), p. 34-40. 
69. 75 N..I. 272,381 T. (2d) 774 (1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). 
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which submitted specifications to prospective bidders for the procurement of 
pumping equipment for a water treatment plant, required that only available 
American manufactured products be used in the work. This power was 
derived from a New Jersey Statute which imposed a Buy-American requirement 
on public works contracts unless materials were not of satisfactory quality or 
the cost would be unreasonable or it would be impracticable to impose such a 
requirement70. The plaintiff, a subsidiary of a German pump manufacturer 
sought an injunction restraining the appellant from opening the bids on the 
ground that the Buy-American provision was unconstitutional. 
The court ruled that the New Jersey Statute did not violate the commerce 
clause. The court reiterated that the state must not attempt to regulate the 
activity of private parties in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce, 
that the local public interest must be weighed against the burden imposed on 
commerce and that the availability of other less onerous measures must be 
considered. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the present case involved the 
"legal impact of the state's entry into the market place as a purchaser of goods 
rather than as a regulator of the commercial activities of others"7I. The court 
relied on the rule stated in Hugues v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. : 
A state's legislation with respect to its purchase of goods and materials for its 
own end use, at least in the absence of federal action, is not subject to the usual 
commerce clause restrictions.n 
The court added that even if the state imposes a Buy-American requirement 
as opposed to a Buy New Jersey requirement, it still pursues a legitimate local 
purpose and is also exempt from commerce clause restrictions. 
Another case which presents a different approach is the case of Japan 
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles1^. In this case, a California tax was 
imposed upon Japanese-owned cargo containers used exclusively for interna-
tional commerce and temporarily stationed in California ports. Appellant 
attacked the constitutional validity of the Buy-American Statute which 
70. Section 52: 33-3 of the Statute provides : "Every contract for the construction [...] of any 
public work in this state shall contain a provision that in the performance of the work the 
contractor and all subcontractors shall use only domestic materials in the performance of 
the work ; but if the head of the department or other public officer authorized by law to 
make the contract shall find that in respect to some particular domestic materials, it is 
impracticable to make such requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost, an 
exception shall be noted in the specifications as to that particular material, and a public 
record made of the findings which justified the exception". 
71. Supra, note 69, p. 785. 
72. Supra, note 69, p. 787. 
73. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
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imposed such a tax on the basis of the foreign commerce clause. The United 
States Supreme Court struck down the California Buy-American Act. It 
ruled that the foreign commerce power is greater that the interstate commerce 
power despite the similar provision of article 1 section 8. The Supreme Court 
discussed the importance of principles of "unanimity" or of "speaking with 
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign countries": 
"In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the 
people of the United States act through a single government with unified and 
adequate national power". [...] "the Federal Government must speak with one 
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments". The 
need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative 
implications of Congress' power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations".74 
With respect to the KSBcast, the court's conclusion that there is no need 
to differentiate between foreign and interstate commerce is questionable. 
This position has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in the Japan 
Line case. Furthermore, the court's reliance on the Alexandria Scrap case 
was erroneous since the latter concerned interstate commerce. 
The principle of unanimity with respect to foreign commerce developed 
in the Japan Line case introduces a new concept in determining the constitu-
tionality of preferential policies under the foreign commerce clause. In view 
of this case, these policies will clearly be subject to closer scrutiny under the 
foreign commerce clause. 
3.1.1.3. Impact of the principle upon protectionist procurement policies 
A few conclusions may be reached from the American case-law with 
respect to the validity of provincial preferential purchasing policies. The KSB 
case provides great support to the claim of validity of these measures. 
However, this position appears to be based on shaky ground in view of the 
decision in the Japan Line case. The power to affect international trade and 
commerce under subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 appears 
subject to closer scrutiny and consequently to a ruling of unconstitutionality. 
In fact, provincial preferential purchasing policies are clearly aimed at 
limiting foreign competition and imports and thus have a significant effect 
upon foreign commerce. The federal jurisdiction over international trade and 
commerce justifiably indicates a desire to "speak with one voice" in matter of 
international trade. 
Furthermore, these policies serve no legitimate provincial interest as 
required by the Alexandria Scrap case since their pith and substance is clearly 
74. Supra, note 73, p. 448, 449. 
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the protection of the Canadian market as opposed to the provincial market. 
These policies do not merely have an incidental effect upon federal policy 
over trade. They constitute more than an exercise by the provinces of their 
police power over its own citizens. These measures are directly aimed at 
Canadian citizens and thus interfere with federal jurisdiction. 
3.1.2. Foreign affairs power 
Foreign relations are a matter of national concern which must be vested 
exclusively in the federal government. In fact, the federal government represents 
the collective interest of the nation as a whole and must therefore be entrusted 
with full and exclusive responsability for the conduct of foreign affairs. To 
maintain control, unity and effectiveness, this power cannot be shared among 
the different levels of government. Government preferential purchasing has 
the effect of destabilizing the economic union and of creating adverse effect 
on foreign economic policy. The foreign affairs powers may represent a 
strong argument for invalidating such preferential policies. 
3.1.2.1. The principle 
1) In Canada : the rule 
The foreign affairs power falls under the international trade and commerce 
category stated at subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This 
interpretation was developed in the case of Citizens' Insurance Co. v. 
Parsons75. 
2) In the U.S. : the rule and its attenuation 
The U.S. Constitution makes no express grant of power to the federal 
government over foreign affairs. Instead, the Constitution grants specific 
powers related to foreign relations to political departments without covering 
the whole field. Article 1 section 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides that: 
"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; [...] [or] 
without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports [...]" Implicitly, the Constitution has vested the control over foreign 
affairs in the federal government without sharing among the states. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation has justly 
75. Supra, note 65. 
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stated that federal power over foreign affairs "[...] did not depend upon the 
affirmative grants of the Constitution"76. It is naturally vested in the federal 
government since it possesses external sovereignty. 
This general rule must nevertheless be attenuated. Case-law has established 
that state legislation may have an incidental or indirect effect on the foreign 
affairs power77. The extent of the federal jurisdiction is therefore not 
absolute. In fact, most exercises of state powers produce effect upon foreign 
affairs. Consequently, the exercise of a valid state power producing a minimal 
impact on federal jurisdiction is constitutionally valid. 
3.1.2.2. Application of the principle 
1) In Canada 
Provincial preferential purchasing policies have not been constitutionally 
challenged with respect to the foreign affairs powers. The administrative 
nature of the policies does not favour judicial review. However, American 
courts have often been confronted with the issue. Their interpretation will 
likely be of valuable interest in the Canadian context. 
2) In the U.S. 
a) Introduction 
In their determination of the legality of preferential policies, courts must 
closely examine the nature of these policies and their effect upon foreign 
affairs. The nature and importance ofthat effect as interpreted by the courts is 
of foremost value. 
b) Cases 
In the case of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners™, the 
court struck down a California Buy-American Statute which encroached on 
the foreign affairs power. Bethlehem Steel Corp. sought an injunction against 
the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles and 
76. 299 U.S. 304(1936), p. 318. 
77. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
78. Supra, note 13. 
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Ducummun to prevent the performance of a contract for the purchase of 
Japanese Steel products for use in the construction of the Los Angeles 
aqueduct. The lowest bid was based on the use of structural steel made in 
Japan. However, the California Statute required the use of American 
products. 
The court ruled that foreign trade was a matter of national concern and 
thus should be left to federal instead of state regulation. Furthermore, the 
California Buy-American Act did not only have an incidental effect on 
foreign relations : 
Such state legislation may bear a particular onus to foreign nations since it may 
appear to be the product of selfish provincialism, rather than an instrument of 
justifiable policy (...). While the present California Statute is not as gross an 
intrusion in the federal domain as others might be, it has a direct impact upon 
foreign relations, and may well adversely effect the power of the central 
government to deal with those problems79. 
The KSB case referred to earlier80 also determined the constitutionality 
of a preferential policy with respect to the foreign affairs power. The court 
upheld the New Jersey Buy-American Statute which required that, under 
certain circumstances, only manufactured products of the U.S. be used in the 
work81. The court decided that the statute did not represent the type of 
intrusion into foreign affairs prescribed in the Zschernig case82. The policy 
was not based on the foreign countries' ideologies, political climate or 
internal policies. Furthermore, the court distinguished this case from the 
Bethlehem Steel case in that the latter concerned a Buy-American Statute of a 
sweeping application. The New Jersey Statute however did not require the 
use of American products if the cost was unreasonable or if inconsistent with 
the public interest or if the policy was impracticable. The court added : 
States may property exercise their police powers and in doing so have some 
permissible effect on foreign trade (...) We read Zschernig (...) to permit state 
regulation which does not result demonstrably in a significant and direct impact 
upon foreign affairs83. 
c) Comments 
According to professor Ivan Bernier84, the Bethlehem Steel case could 
support a finding of unconstitutionality of provincial preferential purchasing 
79. Id., p. 805. 
80. Supra, note 69. 
81. Supra, note 70. 
82. Supra, note 77. 
83. Supra, note 69, p. 784. 
84. I. BERNIER, "La politique d'achat du gouvernement québécois", p. 1, unpublished paper. 
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policies with respect to subsection 91(2). Nevertheless, this conclusion depends 
upon the type of policy at issue. An absolute preferential purchasing policy 
similar to the California Buy-American Act is more easily subject to invalidation. 
The adverse effect on the foreign affairs power is significant. A close analysis 
of the nature and effect of these preferential policies will therefore determine 
their validity. 
The KSB decision with respect to the foreign affairs power is arguable. 
States should not be allowed to legislate in this area. The economic problems 
that are considered through these policies would be better dealt with at the 
federal level. Not only are the impact and effect of these policies at the 
international level better understood by the federal government but states 
also lack the necessary tools and resources. Courts should therefore impose 
strong limitations upon state intrusion in matters of trade policy. 
3.1.2.3. Impact of the principle upon protectionist procurement policies 
The analysis of American cases serves as an important model to determine 
the constitutionality of provincial preferential policies with respect to the 
foreign affairs power. American case-law has reiterated the importance of 
vesting exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal power without dispersion 
among the states85. 
The incidental or indirect effect theory is of no avail in respect to these 
provincial policies. The latter interfere notably with federal foreign policy. 
They are a product of "selfish provincialism [...] which invites retaliative 
restrictions"86. In fact, preferential purchasing is an indirect regulation of 
foreign trade and a disruption of the national policy with respect to trade. 
Moreover, the effect of the policies on foreign affairs is not merely incidental 
to the exercise of a perfectly valid provincial power87. In fact, through 
preferential policies, provinces seek to favour interests beyond the province's 
borders. 
3.2. The G.A.T.T. and the G.P.C. 
Canada and its trading partners have engaged in a wide range of 
international agreements respecting world trade. The main source of interna-
tional rights and obligations in the field of international trade is the General 
85. See U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), p. 233. 
86. Bethlehem Steel Corp. case, supra, note 13, p. 805. 
87. See Zschernig and Clark cases, supra, note 77. 
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Agreement on tariffs and trade. The G.A.T.T. is a multilateral trade agreement, 
concluded in 1947, which emerged from early post-war negotiations. The 
G.A.T.T. consists of a set of rules to which 92 countries, including Canada 
and the United States, are contracting parties. In the United States, the 
G.A.T.T. is the "[•••] supreme Law of the Land [...]" pursuant to article VI 
clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. It is aimed at eliminating trade barriers in 
order to free the international flow of goods. The problem of government 
procurement policies has therefore been addressed generally within the 
G.A.T.T. but more particularly in the Government Procurement Code. 
The G.P.C. emerged from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations ( 1973-1979). This agreement on government procurement which 
supplements the G.A.T.T. and provides for greater precision was ratified by 
Canada, the United States and dozens of other countries88. The agreement's 
main objective is to put an end to discrimination against or among the 
products of other signatories in purchases covered by the agreement. The 
provisions of the Code must be implemented in each country's laws and 
regulations to ensure compliance with the Code by the government purchasing 
entity. In the United States, the G.P.C. has been implemented through the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which authorized the President to waive or 
modify the applicability of the Buy-American Act with regard to suppliers of 
countries that are signatories to the Code or which provide reciprocal 
competitive government procurement opportunities to United States' products 
and suppliers. 
3.2.1. Relevant provisions 
The G.A.T.T. consists namely of a number of rules aimed at reducing the 
non-tariff barriers to trade such as government procurement measures. The 
national treatment clause is one of two main principles embodied in the 
agreement. This general rule and its many exceptions are of particular 
interest. The G.P.C. rules have extended the application of the national 
treatment clause to government procurement policies. However, the Code is 
also of limited application. 
88. Agreement on government procurement, done April 12, 1979, MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev. 
1, a. I, para. 1(b). 
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3.2.1.1. Under the G.A.T.T. 
a) Prohibition to discriminate 
Article 3 paragraph 4 of the G.A.T.T. provides as follows : 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use. [...] 
The national treatment clause is one of the essential provisions of the 
G.A.T.T. Briefly stated, it provides that imported goods are subject within a 
country to the same treatment as domestically produced goods. However, 
this article is subject to a particular exception. 
b) Exception to Art. 3 para. 4 
Article 3 para. 8(a) of the G.A.T.T. provides that : 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased 
for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a 
view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. 
With respect to government procurement, the national treatment clause 
is of limited application. The exception is applicable where purchases are 
made for governmental purposes. It appears that governmental purchases for 
public works are covered by this exception since they are not aimed at 
commercial resale and constitute the exercise of a governmental function. In 
fact, the term "[...] governmental purposes [...]" covers a large part of 
government procurement. 
c) Enforcement of the G.A.T.T. 
The G.A.T.T. enforcement mechanism provides for the settlement of 
disputes which may arise out of the G.A.T.T. obligations. In this respect, 
article XXII provides a general obligation of consultation between the 
contracting parties at the request of a party. Through consultation, parties try 
to obtain a negotiated settlement. Where the consultation procedure has 
failed, article XXIII creates an enforcement procedure. It provides that 
written representations may be made to the party or parties concerned. If no 
settlement is reached within reasonable time, the matter may be referred to 
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the contracting parties who shall investigate and issue the appropriate 
recommendations or ruling. If the circumstances are serious enough, the 
contracting parties may authorize a party to suspend some obligations 
towards the offending party. 
The enforcement procedure is aimed at resolving disputes through 
negotiation. This informal procedure is however deficient to a certain extent. 
First, the contracting parties have delegated to panels the task of investigating 
into the facts of the case. These panels lack the resources to conduct a 
thorough investigation. Secondly, the obligations of the G.A.T.T. do not 
have self-executing legal force in the party's domestic laws. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on negotiation and conciliation rather than adjudication often 
prevents the contracting parties from imposing formal and binding rulings. 
Settlements are left rather to the good-will of the interested parties. Finally, 
the dispute procedure lacks the legal character and formal organization 
necessary to enforce the agreement in a vigorous manner. In short, a 
strengthening of the dispute settlement procedure is in order to ensure 
compliance with G.A.T.T. obligations, enforcement of the agreement and 
adherence to recommendations of the panel. 
3.2.1.2. Under the G.P.C. 
The G.P.C. has opened a large and growing market to international 
trade. Its objective is to ensure greater international competition of procurement 
by governments. This Code completes and modifies to a certain extent the 
G.A.T.T. It poses the principles of tranparency, non discrimination and 
national treatment. The impact of the agreement is however restricted since it 
is intended to apply only as between its parties. Non-signatory G.A.T.T. 
contracting parties are therefore excluded from receiving its benefits. 
a) Prohibition to discriminate 
Article 11(1 )(b) provides that : 
Parties are to accord to the products and suppliers of each other treatment no 
less favourable than (...) that accorded to products and suppliers of any other 
party. 
The provision reiterates the national treatment principle and extends its 
application to government procurement. Signatories to the Code do not 
benefit from the exception of article 3 para. 8a) of the G.A.T.T. Nevertheless, 
this principle is subject to certain limitations. 
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b) Exception to Art. II (l)(b) 
— Service contracts 
The principle of non discrimination in government procurement does 
not apply to service contracts pursuant to article I (l)(a). The G.P.C. covers 
only the procurement of products unless services are incidental to the supply 
of products. In the latter case, the value of the services must not extend 
beyond that of the products. 
— Value of the contracts 
The G.P.C. applies only to procurement contracts of a value of at least 
150 000 SDR (approximately 200 000 $ U.S.). However, the threshold amount 
may not be used to exempt purchases from the agreement by breaking them 
down into a series of contracts. 
— Exclusions relating to purchasing entities 
The Code applies to governmental entities. They comprise government 
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities that are substantially controlled 
by governments (art. I (l)(c)). However, state, provincial or local entities are 
not covered by the Code. Only the governmental entities listed in Annex I of 
the G.P.C. and established by the respective signatory countries are within 
the Code's coverage. Thus, while Canada and United States adherence to the 
Code does imply a significant change in Buy-Canadian and Buy-American 
policy at the federal level, it is clear that the change does not affect provincial 
Buy-Canadian nor state Buy-American preferences. Moreover, purchases of 
certain products of an enlisted entity may be expressly excluded such as 
certain purchases by the Department of Defense in the U.S. entity list. This 
exception severely restrains the scope of the Code. 
— General exceptions to the G.P.C. 
General exceptions to the Code's coverage have been created above all 
for the protection of national security interest and also "to protect public 
morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant life or health, intellectual 
property, or relating to the products of handicapped persons, of philanthropic 
institutions or of prison labour"89. 
89. Id., a. VIII, para. 2. 
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The broad language and discretionary nature of the national security 
and public interest exceptions could somewhat compromise the application 
of the Code. 
c) Transparency 
The G.P.C. provides for measures ensuring that information, practices 
and procedure related to the awards of government procurement contracts 
are made readily available to the parties to the Code. 
— Invitation to participate 
The Code purports to ensure that foreign suppliers are not kept, in a 
discriminatory fashion, from participating in the tendering procedures. An 
entity subject to the G.P.C. may opt for open, public or selective tendering. 
However, the selective tendering procedure is subject to certain requirements 
aimed at eliminating discrimination against foreign suppliers. Entities may 
select suppliers who will be invited to bid among those comprised in a pre-
established list. However, every supplier included on the list shall be given 
equitable opportunities90. Every qualified supplier may request to be added 
on the list within a reasonable time9I and the supplier included on the list may 
not be removed from this list or the list may not be terminated unless he is 
informed92. Furthermore, entities must publish the existence of the list, the 
conditions for inclusion to the list, the period of validity of the lists and the 
formalities for their renewal93. A notice of all purchases must also be 
published94. 
The Code also limits single tendering to situations i) where open or 
selective tendering has been unsuccessful; ii) where, for works of art or 
patented or copyright goods, the products can be supplied only by a particular 
supplier ; iii) when due to urgency and insofar as strictly necessary ; iv) for 
additional deliveries by the original supplier in order to maintain requirements 
of interchangeability with existing equipment ; v) for research, experiment, 
study or original development95. 
90. Id, a. V (6)(b). 
91. Id., a. V (2)(d). 
92. Id., a. V(2)(e). 
93. Id., a. V(6). 
94. Id, a. V(3). 
95. Id., a. V (15). 
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— Obstacles preventing foreign suppliers from submitting a responsive bid 
The G.P.C. ensures that foreign suppliers are not prevented from 
submitting a responsive bid. In that respect, an adequate time limit must be 
prescribed to allow foreign as well as domestic suppliers to prepare and 
submit their bids96. Furthermore, article 11(2) para. 2 provides that "entities 
in the process of qualifying suppliers, shall not discriminate among foreign 
suppliers or between domestic and foreign suppliers". The notice must also 
contain certain essential information such as: any delivery date; whether 
open tender procedures or selective tender procedures will apply ; address of 
entity awarding the contract ; any economic and technical requirements or 
financial guarantees and information required from suppliers ; address and 
date for submitting application as well as any language submission requirements. 
Further, a summary of the notice of tender must be published in one of the 
official languages of the G.A.T.T. and must include contract subject matter, 
time limits for submitting tenders and address from which to secure documents 
relating to the tender97. Finally, the Code, recognizing that quality, safety, 
dimensions, packaging, labelling and conformity certification can be significant 
non-tariff barriers to government procurement from abroad, places restraints 
on government regarding technical specifications of the product which create 
obstacles or have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade98. 
— Submission, receipt and opening of tenders 
Once a foreign supplier has submitted a responsive bid, the governmental 
entity must not impose further discriminatory measures. Provisions of the 
Code regulate the form in which tenders may be submitted99, the opportunities 
to correct unintentional errors between the opening of tenders and the award 
of a contract 10°, the treatment of delayed tendersl01, the supervision offender 
openings with respect to open tenderingl02. A substantial discretion is 
however kept by the entity for the evaluation of bids and the award of the 
contractl03. 
96. Id, a. V (9)(a). 
97. Id, a. V (4). 
98. Id., a. IV (1). 
99. Id., a. V(l4)(a). 
100. Id., a. V(14)(b). 
101. Id., a. V(14)(c). 
102. Id., a. V(l4)(b). 
103. Id., a. V(l4)(f). 
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— Information and review 
The Code's transparency provisions include requirements as to the 
availability of information and as to review proceduresl04. Furthermore, 
unsuccessful suppliers must be informed of certain matters at different stages 
of the procurement process. More specifically, information pertaining to the 
application must be given to a supplier who has applied to become a qualified 
supplierl05. Unsuccessful tenderers must also be informed of the award of a 
contractl06. 
Upon request, a supplier must be informed of the reasons for which he 
was not included on the supplier's list as required and the reasons why he was 
not invited or allowed to tender 107. Still, the governmental entity must justify 
why a supplier's tender was not admitted, explain the characteristics and 
advantages of the selected tender and give the name of the selected tender l08. 
Additional information on the awarded contract may also be obtained from 
the government of the unsuccessful tenderer i09. In case of a complaint, a 
hearing and review procedure is also required "°. 
d) Enforcement of the Code 
The G.P.C. has designed a similar enforcement mechanism to that of the 
G.A.T.T. aimed primarily at obtaining a negotiated settlement. 
— Two basic types of potential non-compliance 
Non-compliance by signatory countries may result either from a bona 
fide disagreement as to the requirement of the Code or from a voluntary non-
compliance by a signatory with the provisions of the Code. The former can 
usually be resolved through negotiation without major obstacles. However, 
the latter may present complicated aspects which require a more comprehensive 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
104. Id, a. VI (1). 
105. Id., a. V (2)(e). 
106. Id., a. VI (3). 
107. Id., a. VI (2). 
108. Id., a. VI (4). 
109. Id., a. VI (6). 
110. Id, a. VI (5). 
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— Complaints 
Private parties such as suppliers do not have the capacity to institute an 
action against a governmental entity for non-compliance with the Code. Only 
the signatory countries to the Code are habilitated to institute enforcement 
procedures ' ". Enforcement procedures are therefore subject to the willingness 
of governments to undertake proceedings and thus dependent upon foreign 
policy and many other considerations. 
— Steps in any dispute resolution 
The Code first provides for consultation between the concerned parties '12. 
The parties therefore have the opportunity to lay out their differences and to 
arrive at a negotiated settlement. If these consultations fail, the Committee on 
Government Procurement, composed of representatives from each party to 
the agreement investigates the matter in order to arrive at a mutually 
satisfying solution m . The failure of the Committee's efforts results in the 
establishment of a panel to examine the problem, assist the parties in finding a 
solution and make a statement as to the facts of the matter so that the 
committee may recommend or rule on the matter. The panel consists of three 
or five members, establishes its own procedures, affords parties an opportunity 
to be heard and aims to complete its work within four months after being 
established IM. The final step provides for action to be undertaken within 
thirty days by the Committee in the form of a recommendation or a ruling. 
Sanctions providing for the suspension of the application of the Code may 
also be authorized by the Committee if its recommendations are not followed. 
Although this procedure is more thorough and efficient than the G. A.T.T. 
enforcement procedure, the Code is still deficient in some respects. First, the 
procedure is subject to the good-will of the government signatory to the Code. 
Private suppliers who are being discriminated against must apply to their 
governments to seek the enforcement of the Code. The dispute settlement 
procedure depends upon each signatory party and its foreign policy and 
interest in the matter. Secondly, although the panel procedure has been 
improved the adjudicative role of the latter remains practically nonexistent 
since it acts primarily as a conciliator. This tends to weaken the impact of 
111. Id., a. VII. 
112. Id., a. VU (3)(5). 
113. Id., a. VII (6). 
114. Id.. a. VII (10). 
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recommendations and rulings upon the party. Furthermore, the recommen-
dations of the committee are not "self-executing" and sanctions will not 
necessarily ensure greater compliance. This depends rather upon the retaliative 
power of the countries. Finally, the settlement procedure is governed by the 
committee on government procurement as opposed to an independent body 
of the signatories. In that respect, recommendations and rulings are often of a 
political nature rather than of a judicial nature. 
3.2.2. The precedents 
3.2.2.1. Canadian cases 
As signatory to the G.A.T.T. agreement on technical barriers in 1979, 
Canada must ensure that foreign suppliers are not discriminated against in 
their bid for government procurement contracts within the country. However, 
as a federal country, the federal parliament cannot impose upon the provinces 
the obligation to implement international treaties such as the G.P.C. with 
respect to matters within provincial jurisdiction. The failure of the federal 
parliament to convince provincial governments to comply with the G.P.C. 
rules may result in retaliative measures on the part of other signatory 
countries against Canada. 
Canadian courts have been silent as to the impact of the G.A.T.T. and 
the G.P.C. on provincial preferential procurement policies. American courts 
will therefore once again serve as a model. 
3.2.2.2. U.S. cases and comments 
U.S. courts have from time to time considered the G.A.T.T. to be "self-
executing" and consequently allowed individuals to rely upon the provisions 
of the agreement to challenge state laws. Broadly speaking, in the United 
States, an international agreement prevails over all inconsistent state legislation, 
prior or subsequent, as well as inconsistent prior federal legislation, although 
it does not supersede inconsistent subsequent federal legislation. However, 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which approved the G.P.C. and implemented 
it into American law does not seem to recognize its provisions as "self-
executing". Besides, the protection of the Buy-American Act is waived only as 
to countries which, either by agreeing to the Code or by offering the same 
benefits to the United States via separate agreement, do not discriminate 
against U.S. products and suppliers. As to the validity of state Buy-American 
laws with respect to the G.A.T.T., the courts are divided upon the interpretation 
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to be given to article III para. 8a) exception to the national treatment clause 
stated in the G.A.T.T. 
In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Courtll5, the California 
Court of Appeal struck down the California Buy-American Statute on the 
basis of the G.A.T.T. provisions. The city of San Francisco had issued an 
invitation to tender for the procurement of turbines and equipment for a 
generating station. The contract proposal required that "all material, supplies 
and equipment covered by this contract proposal shall be manufactured in 
the U.S." "6. The contract was awarded to the lowest bidder, a supplier who 
intended to use foreign manufactured turbines. The appelant sought the 
enforcement of the Buy-American provision. 
The court ruled that this provision violated the national treatment clause 
of article III para. 4 of the G.A.T.T. and thus "[...] the supreme Law of the 
Land [...]" 'l7. Furthermore, the exception pertaining to government procure-
ment stated at article III para. 8a) did not save the Buy-American provision 
since electricity is a commodity which can be used for commercial resale. The 
product is therefore not "acquired for purely governmental purposes". 
The KSB Technical Sales case referred to earlier "8 was also ruled upon 
with respect to article III, para 8a) of the G.A.T.T. This case concerned the 
procurement of water pumps which imposed a Buy-American requirement as 
authorized by the New Jersey Statute '19. The New Jersey court upheld the 
state Buy-American Act. Although article III para. 4 applied to this case, the 
New Jersey Statute entered within the purview of article III para. 8a) since the 
supply of water to the public is a "governmental purpose". The court relied on 
the fact that the New Jersey statute considers the Water Supply Commission 
as an "instrumentality exercising public and essential governmental functions"l20. 
Furthermore, water is a common property transmitted to the public in their 
general interest and without regard to profit. 
The KSB court's interpretation of article III para. 8a) is questionable. It 
considered the supply of water a governmental function and thus not aimed at 
commercial resale. This view is too narrow. Not only does article III para. 8a) 
exception require that procurement be for a governmental purpose but also 
not for commercial resale. The two requirements are not alternatives. It is not 
15. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803 (1962). 
16. Id., p. 807. 
17. A. VI, para. 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 
18. Supra, note 69. 
19. See supra, note 70. 
20. N.J.S.A. 58:5-35. 
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sufficent for a procurement to be for governmental purpose. Furthermore, 
although the New Jersey Statute characterized the Water Supply Commission 
as exercising a governmental function, it did not ensue that the para. 8a) 
exception should automatically apply. Definite and judicious criteria should 
be used. 
The term "governmental purpose" should be interpreted with regard to 
the foreign sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines. Immunity from 
suits in American courts has been granted to foreign sovereign states acting in 
a public capacity as opposed to a commercial or private capacity. This foreign 
sovereign immunity is codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976. The latter defines commercial activity by examining the nature of the 
act rather than the purpose of the act. With respect to article III para. 8a), this 
doctrine would therefore narrow the scope of the "governmental purpose" 
exception. Consequently, it is doubtful that the New Jersey Statute would 
have been upheld since, considering the nature of the act, the governmental 
entity was acting rather in a commercial or private capacity. 
3.2.3. Impact of the G.A.T.T. and the C.P.C. upon protectionist procurement 
policies 
To the extent that the competent authorities have implemented both the 
G.A.T.T. and the G.P.C. in their bodies of laws, these agreements entail an 
obligation not to discriminate within the country at least with respect to 
government procurement. Theoretically, many provincial preferential pro-
curement policies clearly violate the national treatment clause. Within a 
federal country, a federal parliament may not impose upon the provincial 
governments the respect of international obligations it contracted and which 
concern matters of provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of article III 
para. 8a), government purchases for governmental purpose and not aimed at 
commercial resale are exempted from the general rule. American courts 
remain unsettled as to the interpretation of governmental purpose. A narrower 
interpretation of the expression is necessary to ensure greater coverage of the 
general rule. 
In order to ensure a wider application of the G.P.C, Canada should 
require that provincial governments and their agencies be added to the list of 
entities annexed to the Code or that the appropriate legislative body enact a 
statute implementing the G.P.C. in provincial laws. Otherwise, provincial 
preferential policies contrary to the G.P.C. will not be affected. 
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Conclusion 
Under the present constitutional provisions, many statutory procurement 
policies adopted at the provincial or state and local level may be incompatible 
with federal jurisdiction over interprovincial or interstate trade and in some 
respects with jurisdiction over international relations. Such policies disrupt 
federal foreign trade policy, create national economic disparity and upset the 
domestic flow of goods. They invite retaliative action from external trading 
partners. 
However, Canadian courts have not had so far the opportunity to deal 
with this question as their American counterparts have done. Legally, these 
policies should be constrained by the relevant constitutional texts. This 
situation might change with a new political environment. In fact, the political 
arena should intervene to reduce these non-tariff barriers to trade and to urge 
the harmonization of economic policy with the provinces. Stronger economic 
unity and strength is needed. 
Mobility rights and equality rights are fundamental rights recognized to 
all American and Canadian citizens alike. To the extent that preferential 
policies purport to favour local labour or to exclude persons from bidding on 
contracts on the basis of place of residence or other discriminatory rights, 
governments should bear a heavy burden of justifying those impediments. 
Precedence should be granted to these constitutional rights in the absence of 
rigorous justification for such measures. 
Safeguards for international free trade have been implemented through 
the G.A.T.T. and the G.P.C. However, the federal government has not yet 
made the necessary regulatory and statutory changes to integrate these 
agreements into federal law. As to the provinces, they have not, by and large, 
implemented the G.A.T.T. agreement. 
The effectiveness of these agreements appears doubtful. The courts, 
especially in Canada, are reticent to take these international agreements into 
consideration. Furthermore, the G.A.T.T. mechanism for enforcing its obli-
gations is largely deficient. Loopholes created by the many exceptions to 
G.A.T.T. rules and the failure to ensure a proper constraining compliance 
procedure diminish greatly the impact of these agreements on preferential 
policies. 
Even in the context of the free trade agreement concluded between 
Canada and the United States on October 3, 1987, there is still room for 
protectionist policies. Despite the fact that the primary objective of the 
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accord remains the eventual dismantling of the commercial border between 
the world's two largest trading partners, within ten years beginning January 
1989, a total elimination of these policies is nonetheless doubtful, considering 
the regional disparities and the political pressure which may justify both 
governments' desire to sustain them. 
However, in order to ensure that protectionist policies do not hinder the 
prospect of trade liberalization, a strong and expeditious dispute settlement 
mechanism has been set up under the agreement. Dispute not resolved in 
consultation will be automatically referred to a neutral binational panel 
which will operate as a court of last resort. 
The agreement extends to government procurement as well. Both sides 
have agreed to eliminate many "buy national" restrictions by lowering from 
171000$ to 25000$ the threshold at which the open and competitive 
procedures created under the G.P.C. must be followed. Consequently, all 
procurements over 25 000$ made by entities covered by the Code will be 
opened to Canadian suppliers. It must be kept in mind, however, that 
provinces and states are not listed in Annex I of the G.P.C. and thus, are not 
subject to this clause, relating to the acquisition of products. However, 
provinces are bound by chapter 14 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
dealing with services. But again, government procurement is excluded by 
subsection 14.02 of the Agreement. 
In spite of the fact that this lacuna seems to impede the effectiveness of 
the accord, it is still possible to sustain the contention that both countries will 
adjust and reconsider their protectionist policies at a national level : the 
agreement's general objective of elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers as well as the establishment of the very first international understanding 
over the services industries under which each side agrees to provide treatment 
to each other's citizens that is no less favourable than that granted to its own 
citizens, are likely to create a momentum inducing Canada and the United 
States to put their respective houses in order. 
